Security
This page is for whoever answers for the company's security: what an agent can reach, where each secret lives, and what Agentome does not protect. It describes an installation on the company's server with places under gVisor, as on Deploy on your server; a person's computer gets less, as the last section says.
An agent is a program that runs commands
An agent reads tasks, issues, code and documents that other people wrote, and any of them can carry text that tells it to do something else. So Agentome does not rely on the agent behaving: each run gets only what its task needs, and the rest is out of its reach whatever it does.
Where a run happens
A person's agents run in their place, a container the platform makes for them on the server. Each run in it gets two containers of its own, made when it starts and deleted when it ends:
- The CLI container runs the official Claude Code or Codex, unmodified, with the person's sign-in to their subscription.
- The sandbox runs every command the agent runs: builds, tests,
git, scripts. It has the task's repository and nothing of the sign-in, the CLI or the platform's own settings. The CLI'sbashandgitpass each command there.
So a command the agent was talked into cannot read the subscription's token, and the CLI never runs a command itself. Every place and every run has a kernel of its own under gVisor, not the host's. A place has a read-only root, no Linux capabilities, at most 2 CPUs and 8 GB of memory, and no DNS for names outside. The service that makes containers holds no Docker socket: a guard does, with no network, and passes only the calls that make places and runs. Places, the sandbox and a run's own Docker never get the host's folders, ports or namespaces.
A place runs a person's subscription only while that person is at work in Agentome, and the person signs the CLI in themselves, in the place's terminal. Agentome neither reads nor keeps the sign-in, and never runs a subscription for anyone else.
What a run can reach
A place has no way out but the egress proxy, which knows every call's token and lets it through to its own list only:
- The CLI reaches the model vendors and Agentome.
- Commands reach Agentome and the hosts the task's project allows, which an admin lists: the company's GitLab, Jira, a package mirror. Not the model vendors.
- A project's services, such as its database, are reached by name from the sandbox and reach nothing outside.
The proxy takes only HTTPS through CONNECT, to the name that was asked for, on port 443 unless
the list names another. It checks the address a name resolves to, never connects to the
server's own machine or to link-local addresses, and reaches the company's private networks
only for a host listed by its full name. It reads the server name of each connection and
nothing inside it. Every host it lets through or refuses is in the run's log, and a refused one
shows in the project's Network section with Allow beside it.
Where the secrets are
| Secret | Where it is | Who uses it |
|---|---|---|
| A person's subscription sign-in | Their place's home volume, on the server | The CLI in a run's CLI container |
| The code host, Jira and MCP server tokens | The Agentome database, encrypted | The server's gateway and git proxy |
| Model API keys, for agents on the server | The Agentome database, encrypted | The server's relay, which adds them to a call |
| A run's token | The run, until it ends | The run's tools, git and way out |
| The installation's secret key | The data folder, or the environment on Kubernetes | The server |
Integration tokens never reach a place or a computer. An agent's tools go through the server's
MCP gateway, with the run's token, which applies the agent's policies to each call: allow,
ask a person first, or deny. Its git goes through the server's git proxy, which adds the
code host's token on the way. The model relay does the same for API keys. A run's token stops
working when the run ends.
The database keeps these secrets under AES-256-GCM, with a key drawn from the installation's
secret key. A backup holds the database and not the key. agentome rotate-key seals everything
under a new key when the old one may have leaked.
What an agent can push
The git proxy opens only the repository of the run's task, and holds every push to rules the agent cannot change:
- only to branches named
agent/…, never tomain, a release branch or a tag; - no branch is deleted, and no push options pass, so GitLab cannot be told to open or merge a merge request past its owner;
- a push lands first on a ref of the proxy's own, on which no pipeline runs, and moves its branch
only when it keeps the branch's history and leaves the CI configuration as the default branch
has it: on GitLab the CI file and every file it includes, on GitHub the
.githubfolder and the local actions its workflows use.
A change request is opened by a tool, under the agent's policies, and merged by a person.
People and access
- People sign in with a password and, on Enterprise, through Keycloak. Every admin also signs in with a code from an authenticator app.
- An agent belongs to a person, and others reach it only through grants. A project's runs reach only that project's connections and hosts.
- An admin may disable a person, which puts their place to sleep, and delete a place with its sign-in.
What Agentome does not protect
- The pipeline still runs the agent's code. A push to
agent/…starts the repository's pipeline, which runs the tests and scripts the agent wrote. Keep CI secrets out of its reach: protected variables on GitLab, environments on GitHub (Integrations). - The CLI's own traffic to its vendor is not inspected. The proxy decides by host only; what the CLI sends its model is between the person's subscription and the vendor.
- Whoever is root on the server reads everything: the sign-ins on the places' volumes, the database and the key. Treat the server as you treat the code host.
- A person's computer gets less. An agent that runs on someone's computer works inside the CLI's own sandbox on that machine, with the person's key and token folders closed to it, but on the person's kernel and network. For a company, places on the server are the way.
Found something? Write to the address in SECURITY.md; please do not open a public issue.